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THE PERCEPTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL 
REPORTING: A HALF CENTURY DOWN THE DRAIN? 
By 
Paul Garner, University of Alabama 
The query in the title of this little 
piece is occasioned by a coincidence 
which occurred to me some weeks ago, 
when three items appeared in prominent 
business and financial publications, 
namely The Wall Street Journal, Business 
Week magazine, and the Financial Ana-
lysts Journal. 
The Wall Street Journal for June 1, 
1979, page 14, has the headline "Public is 
Losing Confidence in Accuracy of Cor-
porate Reports, SEC Chief Warns". In the 
article, Chairman Harold Williams of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
warned that public confidence in the 
accuracy of corporate financial reports is 
deteriorating rapidly. He further charged 
that "there is an enormous and growing 
perception and credibility gap between 
financial reporting and economic reality", 
and he urged that accountants reduce the 
gap. 
A few days later, in the June 4, 1979 
issue of Business Week (pages 114-115) in 
connection with a review of an analysis 
made by Professor Lee Seidler, in his 
regularly issued publication prepared for 
Bear, Stearns, and Company, called 
"Accounting Issues", Professor Seidler 
suggested that a prominent company, the 
SCM Corporation, used "creative ac-
counting" in its annual report for 1978, 
as compared with the 1977 fiscal year. 
The Business Week writer said that "de-
spite all the talk of self-policing on the 
part of the accounting establishment, 
accounting techniques can still be applied 
with a. great deal of artistry and selec-
tivity. It all depends on whether a com-
pany wants to teach or titillate inves-
tors." Professor Seidler, in his detailed 
tabular presentation, suggested that the 
reported earnings per share for fiscal year 
1977 of $3.70, versus fiscal year 1978, of 
$3.75, could possibly have been "ad-
justed" to $4.46 for 1977 fiscal year, ver-
sus $2 for fiscal 1978, per share. After a 
couple of weeks or so, the Letters to the 
Editor Department of Business Week for 
July 2, contained a letter from the Vice 
President for Finance of the SCM Cor-
poration, taking issue with Professor Seid-
ler and the reporter of Business Week 
magazine, with "your readers deserve 
more informed reporting. Had you 
studied our annual report, and not merely 
another's account of it, I am sure that 
you would agree it fully discloses all 
material facts about our fiscal year re-
ports." 
The t h i r d item (Contemporary) 
selected is found in the Financial 
Analysts Journal (March-April 1979) be-
ginning on page 72, under the title of 
"The FASB—Eliminator of Managed 
Earnings?" by Professors Dean Graber 
and Bill Jarnagin. The article starts with 
"Over the years, accountants have been 
criticized for their ability to massage the 
numbers. Critics contend that managed 
earnings are a product of accountants' 
leeway to choose among a multitude of 
accounting alternatives when preparing 
financial statements." They quote Pro-
fessor John C. Burton, former chief ac-
countant of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, "The way you keep the 
score determines at least in part the way 
you play the game." 
The coincidence referred to in the first 
paragraph above arises because of the fact 
that about the time I was reading the 
above three items in publications with 
millions of readers, I was presented with a 
slender volume published nearly a half a 
century ago (1930) by Alexander Hamil-
ton Institute entitled "Investment and 
Speculation". The author was Mr. M. S. 
Rukeyser, who was commented on in the 
Preface by the publisher's editor-in-chief, 
the well-known Joseph French Johnson. 
Mr. Rukeyser was a prominent reporter 
and special writer of finance business for 
a number of widely read publications of 
that era, including the New York Tri-
bune, The Financial Department of 
Vanity Fair, the New York American, 
and the New York Evening Journal, plus 
being the author of scores of other works. 
In addition, Mr. Rukeyser "has studied 
and advised 30 thousand or more individ-
uals on their financial plans and prob-
(Continued on Page 8) 
The Accounting Historians 
1
Garner: Perception of public confidence in financial reporting: A half century down the drain?
Published by eGrove, 1979
CALL FOR PAPERS ON 
ACCOUNTING HISTORY YOUR 
Chance of Success— 
"There will, of course, be the ex-
ceptional man who will come up 
through that routine training and 
dominate his field by the force of his 
intellect, but in the main the new con-
ditions of affairs demand a superior 
training such as only the schools can 
give." 
Without Education — 
1 Chance in 150,000 
Elementary Education — 
4 Chances in 150,000 
High School Education — 
87 Chances in 150,000 
College Education — 
800 Chances in 150,000 
From: Washington (D.C.) School of 
Accountancy 
1922-23 Catalog 
Contributed by G. H. Newlove 
Persons wishing to present papers on 
the subject of Accounting History at the 
annual meeting to be held in Boston, 
Massachusetts, August 10-13, 1980, are 
requested to submit two copies of each of 
the following: 
1. an outline of their research (maxi-
mum 5 pages) 
2. a 100 word abstract 
3. a current resume 
This material, inquiries and other cor-
respondence should be addressed to: 
Professor H. Thomas Johnson 
Department of Accounting 
Western Washington University 
Bellingham, WA 98225 
Phone: (206) 676-3202 
To meet deadlines it is essential that 
proposals be received no later than Jan-
uary 15, 1980. 
NOTABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO ACCOUNTING 
LITERATURE AWARD 
Members of the American Accounting 
Association are invited to suggest works 
for nomination for the AICPA Notable 
Contributions to Accounting Literature 
Award. These nominations are restricted 
to articles published in either regular or 
irregular periodicals during the calendar 
year ending December 31, 1979 and 
books or irregular publications published 
during the five year calendar years then 
ending. 
The latest date for receiving nomina-
tions is February 15, 1980. Please address 
your suggestions to: Dr. D. Larry Crumb-
ley, AAA Committee to Nominate Out-
standing Contributions to Accounting 
Literature, Department of Accounting, 
Texas A&M University, College Station, 
Texas 77843. 
HELP 
The Editor asks your assistance in pro-
viding information on accounting history 
meetings or other noteworthy items. 
Please send them along to: Notebook, 
Box 658, University Plaza, Atlanta, 
Georgia 30303. 
Accounting historians will enjoy 
William Faulkner's use of the "ledger" 
(more appropriately, a daybook) in The 
Bear. Faulkner expands the use of an 
accounting record to include, biography, 
conversation, debate, employee evalua-
tion and family lineage. 
A. McKelly Lynch 
University of North Alabama 
GARNER (continued) 
lems." He lectured widely throughout the 
country, and spoke on the radio networks 
regularly. These activities are mentioned 
in order to indicate that he probably was 
a keen lay observer of the accounting and 
investment scene in the years immedi-
ately before the great depression, and at 
its beginning when the little book of 350 
pages was written. He was not an ac-
countant by profession, having studied 
literature, journalism, and economics at 
Columbia University. 
In view of the fact that financial and 
business reporters for general readers can 
still make the headlines, as indicated in 
the three examples above, in 1979, it is a 
bit of curiosity that a prominent writer of 
a half century ago can also be quoted 
along substantially the same lines, even 
though it is natural that the phaseology 
may be a bit different. Therefore, after 
going through the 350 pages carefully, 
and noting all of the comments and con-
(Continued on next page) 
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GARNER (continued) 
clusions on public confidence in account-
ing and financial reporting in the early 
days of the great depression, one may be 
permitted some doubt as to how much 
"progress" has been accomplished in the 
preceding five decades. 
However, in order for the reader to 
draw his or her own comparisons and 
conclusions, I am presenting the gist of 
some quotations from the book written 
in the early part of 1930. It will be re-
called that the corporate investment com-
munity had been in a turmoil for the pre-
ceding four or five months, and Mr. 
Rukeyser makes reference to the traumas 
of September and October 1929; but 
curiously, in view of the later more tragic 
collapse and discouragement, Mr. Rukey-
ser thought that the developments in the 
fall of 1929 were only temporary in their 
significance to the country. Actually, he 
made little reference to the remote pos-
sibility of the calamity which of course 
struck the world in the next three years. 
The first chapter of the book is titled 
"Spending Versus Saving" and a consider-
able number of the paragraphs could well 
be quoted from current literature and 
articles by popular writers. For example, 
"the proprietor of the business should 
distinguish between saving for his busi-
ness and for his own personal thrift. Once 
a business pays out profits, it has lost 
control over them. As long as profits are 
retained, however, the management of 
the business retains options affecting the 
ultimate disposition of the funds." Busi-
ness people who now visit their friendly 
banker are still told that "banks are eager 
to lend to concerns whose finances have 
been prudently husbanded, but are reluc-
tant, or unwilling, to lend to those that 
have intemperately dissipated profits." 
In his work with the 30 thousand indi-
viduals, Mr. Rukeyser became a keen 
observer of the American people in regard 
to spending versus saving: "A large pro-
portion of American families, whose ob-
jective is keeping up with the Joneses, not 
only spend 100% of their income, but 
actually exceed their income by indulging 
in their futile whims. Psychologically, the 
objection of such careless financial 
management is that it over emphasizes 
the place of money in the family econ-
omy. The thriftless are perpetually ab-
sorbed with money problems; bickerings 
over bills between husbands and wives; 
with attempts on the part of bread win-
ners to temporize with collectors; and 
with the torment that comes from a deep 
seated consciousness that the home one 
has built for his family is merely a house 
of cards." 
The author then compares the eco-
nomic management of the household 
with that of a bookie at the race track. 
The latter keeps two columns of figures: 
"One marked "take," which represents 
the income, and the other "paid," which 
represents outlays. The bookie's solvency 
depends on taking in more than he pays 
out." The conclusion is that a business 
enterprise, or a household, must take in 
more than it pays out; and this is where 
the theme of the book comes to the fore-
front, namely investments. 
Finally, on the subject of spending ver-
sus saving, the advantage of compound 
interest should not be overlooked. If a 
younger person saves a dollar for his old 
age, instead of spending it upon "imme-
diate gratification of a passing impulse, 
the wastrel takes up not one dollar, but 
perhaps six, for the saved dollar has with-
in itself the capacity of repeated duplica-
tion." 
In the days before social security, and 
the welfare appropriations, Mr. Rukeyser 
could write "if it were true that the world 
owed each of us a living, there would be 
no need of individual thrift. But, whether 
the world owes us a living or not, experi-
ence shows that no one will cash the 
claims of the improvident to a living. The 
prudent man knows that life is subject to 
external flux, as a famous Greek philos-
opher remarked long ago." 
Also, in the days before the "three 
martini lunches", the man who is building 
up his good will by lavishly dispensing 
"$100 bills to hostesses at night clubs, is 
really looked down upon by his asso-
ciates." 
After the discussion of spending versus 
saving, the author begins his treatment of 
fields of investment, with an extensive 
(relatively) discussion of widely owned 
railroad security investments. It is at this 
point that Mr. Rukeyser starts to com-
ment on accounting related subjects. He 
seems to conclude that railroad securities 
have an advantage because they must be 
"revealed in accordance with standard-
ized accounting practice". They are not 
"subject to irregularity, tardiness, and 
lack of standardization, as are the reports 
of unregulated industrials. Frequently, 
industrial corporations deliberately hide 
earnings and assets." At the same time, 
"railroads must submit monthly reports 
on earnings and expenses." It was of 
course several years later before industrial 
companies began the regular practice of 
reporting on a quarterly (at least) basis. 
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GARNER (continued) 
At a later place in the same chapter 
the author has three paragraphs on "ac-
counting methods of industrials". He con-
cluded that "the most conservative indus-
trial concerns write off intangible assets 
to the sum of $ 1 . " As contrasted with the 
General Electric Company, "whose good 
will and patents are unquestionably of 
enormous worth, and which are carried at 
a dollar on the balance sheet, numerous 
promotion companies whose good will is 
zero and whose patents are purely of a 
conjectural value, frequently set these up 
on the balance sheet at a high figure." In 
the opinion of Mr. Rukeyser, "enterprises 
that pursue satisfactory accounting meth-
ods set up large reserves against deprecia-
tion and obsolescence." 
In another section of the same chap-
ter, the author makes reference to the 
New York Stock Exchange as an outside 
influence in getting the companies to 
publish at least once a year a balance 
sheet and an income account. This was of 
course accomplished a few years later. 
Mr. Rukeyser paid tribute to the late E. 
H. Gary who had been chairman of the 
United States Steel Corporation. Mr. 
Gary was described as "a pioneer in the 
advocacy and practice of more enlight-
ened accounting methods." Moreover, 
"Mr. Gary made it a practice to give out 
earnings statements at 3 o'clock on given 
days, after the Stock Market has closed, 
and he withheld advance information 
from directors and other insiders, putting 
all stock holders on a parity in respect to 
the time of receiving data concerning the 
progress of the corporation." But in gen-
eral, the overall view and appraisal of Mr. 
Rukeyser was that "industrial corpora-
tions are still in the realm of accounting 
anarchy and are, for the most part, lim-
ited only by the conscience of manage-
ment. Many of the very best industrial 
corporations go to extremes in account-
ing conservatism and deliberately hide 
earnings and assets from stockholders." 
In the light of the tens of thousands of 
pages that have been written on the oil 
businesses in recent decades, the com-
ments of Mr. Rukeyser on investments in 
oil companies have some curiosity inter-
est. A half a century ago it could be writ-
ten that "many a man of small means, 
with a vast amount of hope, has expected 
to find in oil stocks the vehicle that 
would bring him the wealth of John D. 
Rockefeller. Oil production is still primi-
tive in character, even though it is under-
going important changes of method. In 
the present state of the art, there is a 
good deal of uncertainty as to how long 
such production will continue, and as to 
whether there is any oil in unproved 
wells. Moreover, there are numerous 
economic hazards, such as whether pre-
vailing prices will enable companies to 
produce oil and sell it at a profit. The 
large oil companies have for years relied 
on wild cat methods to find new fields." 
In a chapter on "Changing Value of 
Investments" the author comes to the 
conclusion that "even the best financial 
statements are statements of opinion 
rather than purely objective documents. 
In the last analysis, they represent the 
opinion of the directors. Their value is 
only relative, or comparative." 
On the subject of "adequate deprecia-
tion allowance" Mr. Rukeyser urges that 
"a depreciation fund should be set up out 
of earnings to allow for the wastage. If 
the depreciation fund is significantly 
larger than the actual declining value of 
property, it may be carried on the liabil-
ity side and really represent accumulation 
of net profits that the corporation, in the 
last analysis, owes to its own stockhold-
ers. Sometimes the item is found both on 
the asset side and on the liability side. 
When it appears exclusively on the liabil-
ity side, the depreciation fund usually is 
composed of general assets." Following 
the chapter on changing value, the subject 
of "internal factors" is treated at length. 
Under this topic, an appraisal of what 
constitutes good management arises. The 
accounting implication of this is found in 
the sentence: "The thoughtful student, 
however, will look behind profit state-
ments to ascertain whether the company 
has been conservative in making charges 
against profits and in setting up reserves 
against invisible foes or future profits." 
As a prelude to the labor difficulties of 
the mid 1930s, "good management signi-
fies an ability to maintain cordial rela-
tionship with employees." 
In light of the crisis situation which 
began in the fall of 1929, Mr. Rukeyser 
felt that it was necessary to discuss 
"methods of successful investors" in a 
rather long chapter. He quotes the invest-
ment philosophy of the chief executive of 
one of the large insurance companies to 
the effect that the "practice of undervalu-
ing our securities is now a permanent 
feature of our investment policy." The 
executive looked forward "to the time in 
the not distant future when we will have 
an undisclosed margin so vast that even 
the present large figure will appear com-
paratively small." 
In a down-to-the-earth chapter on 
"Wall Street Merchandising" there is a 
sub-section ten on "Juggling the Balance 
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GARNER (continued) 
Sheet". Here, we find some of the most 
significant appraisals of 1930 accounting 
matters, such as "some corporation offi-
cials deceive by padding earnings state-
ments, that is, by carrying assets, such as 
inventory, at too high a figure on the bal-
ance sheet, thus giving an exaggerated 
notion of the alleged profits. On the 
other hand, some of the strongest and 
best companies listed give stockholders 
the wrong impression by understating 
assets and earnings. The question may be 
raised whether it makes much difference 
to the outside stockholder whether he is 
deceived by exaggeration or by under-
statement. Padding balance sheets and in-
come accounts has been generally de-
nounced, but the reverse process of with-
holding facts regarding the true nature of 
profits and assets has been condoned as 
conservative accounting. Where a com-
pany habitually hides assets and earnings, 
it opens itself to the suspicion that it is 
intentionally giving an advantage to direc-
tors, officers, and bankers who alone are 
privy to the secret." 
Mr. Rukeyser condemns inadequacies 
in 1929 and 1930 corporate accounting: 
"As long as certain corporate balance 
sheets and income accounts are travesties 
on revealing accounts, there will be 
mystery markets. When a company is 
telling only half a truth about earnings, 
outsiders in times of optimism might as-
sume that the authentic facts are four 
times as favorable as the published ones. 
Likewise, in bad periods, they might as-
sume that the facts are twice as black as 
they really are. In times of panic, com-
panies that have hitherto hid assets and 
earnings have shown an informal tend-
ency in statements by officers to disclose 
a little more of the true position." He 
then discusses two named specific com-
pany examples and draws the foreboding 
conclusion that "unless corporations 
volunteer to improve their practices, the 
demands for legislation to enforce ac-
counting standards on industrial corpora-
tions seems inevitable." 
In presenting "the test of adequate 
financial information," Mr. Rukeyser 
quotes one of the editors of a then promi-
nent financial magazine to the effect that 
"it would be a good thing if every direc-
tor and executive of a successful corpora-
tion would put himself in the place of the 
average stockholder and ask himself the 
question: would I hold as much of the 
stock as I do were my information lim-
ited to what is contained in the annual or 
other report?" 
The banking community then comes 
in for a bit of comment with the sum-
mary statement that "banks themselves 
are notorious offenders in the matter of 
hiding assets and earnings. They habit-
ually write off large amounts as reserves 
against bad loans, without setting forth 
clearly what their practice is." But banks 
are not alone in such a practice: "Indus-
trial corporations sometimes hide the ebb 
and flow of profit by setting up reserves 
against contingencies in good years, and 
by using them up in bad years." However, 
sophisticated stockholders can get the 
"true picture" by deducting the depleted 
"reserves from the reported net profit". 
Earnings may be hid in other ways de-
scribed by Mr. Rukeyser and he cites one 
of the then (and now) major merchan-
dising firms for not distinguishing clearly 
between operating expenses and capital 
expenditures. 
After mentioning other cautions such 
as nonuniformity in depreciation charges, 
Mr. Rukeyser concludes his admonitions 
to investors and speculators with the 
point that "these and other subtle subsur-
face distinctions help explain current 
anomalies in market prices of shares. 
Some buyers have confidence in figures 
put out by one group and lack confidence 
in those published by others. The fact 
that many published statements are used 
to conceal authentic conditions rather 
than to reveal them helps to explain why 
Wall Street security buying has become 
metaphysical rather than scientific." 
As a forecaster, Mr. Rukeyser would 
receive good marks in his predictions that 
"the ownership of American corporations 
will become more widely diffused, and 
therefore there is an increasing moral ob-
ligation on the part of corporate execu-
tives to publish better financial reports 
that will tend to put outsiders on a parity 
with insiders in respect to the changing 
facts about a company's condition. And, 
such information should be published 
promptly." 
If one thinks about the present state 
of financial reporting in the United 
States, and compares it with the com-
ments and conclusions of the popular 
writer Mr. Rukeyser of a half century 
ago, one may conclude that progress is 
indeed evident during the five decades, 
but he or she might well remain ambiva-
lent as to the extent of the progress. 
Merry 
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